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Ever so often, academics bemoan the lack of attention (scholarly or public or both) 
to their discipline or subfield (or a subject or topic therein) and demand or plead, as the 
case may be, for greater consideration to what they claim has heretofore been improperly 
neglected.  Every so often, academics do an about face: call for the “death” or “end” of 
something—usually with –ism or –ology as suffixes.
1  Such appeals are rarely heeded and 
often bring about the opposite (and frequently, th e intended) result: greater inter est in 
whatever was supposed to—or whatever some people purportedly hoped would—cease to 
exist (for a discussion, see Brisman 2005, 2007). 
Both  clamor  for  elevating  and  for  euthanisizing  a  particular  scholarly  endeavor 
usually  come  on  the  heels  of  significant  disagreement,  in-fighting,  or  perceived 
ineffectiveness within the discipline or subfield.  Given Gregg Barak’s observation that there 
is  rarely  “any  type  of  integration  or  accommodation  between  establishment  and  anti-
establishment  criminologies,”  Walter  DeKeseredy  (2011:57)  claim  that  “[c]riminology  is 
fragmented and academic criminology is under siege,” and Jeff Ferrell, Keith Hayward, and 
Jock Young’s (2008:204) declaration that “[m]ainstream criminology is an abject failure,” 
one should not be surprised if someone were to explicitly state that “criminology is dead” or 
that it should be exterminated and reborn. 
 
                                                 
1 For the “end of art,” see Danto (1997); Kuspit (2004); for the “end of the art world,” see Morgan (1998); for the 
“death of environmentalism,” see Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007).  Anthropology seems particularly obsessed 
with its own mortality.  In the 1980s, some anthrpopologists began to question the utility of the “anthropology of 
law” as  a separate subfield and to either call for its  abolition or predict its  demise  (see, e.g., Chanock 1983; 
Comaroff  and  Roberts  1981;  Francis  1984;  Snyder  1981a,  1981b;  see  also  Starr  and  Collier  (1989)  for  an 
overview).  More recently, the Jensen Memorial Lecture series, held at the Frobenius Institute, Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe University, in Frankfurt am Main during the spring of 2008, took “The End of Anthropology?” as its topic.  
The lectures were later published as articles in the December 2010 issue of American Anthropologist (see Comaroff 
2010; Comaroff and Kohl 2010; Gingrich 2010; Hannerz 2010). Journal of Theoretical and Philosopphical Criminology   Commentray 
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Were he less humble, Robert Agnew, Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Sociology 
at  Emory  University  and  President-Elect  of  the  American  Society  of  Criminology,  might 
undertake a Lazarus-like project in Toward a Unified Criminology: Integrating Assumptions 
about Crime, People, and Society: pronounce that criminology has run its course and then 
attempt  to  resuscitate  it  with  a  strain  of theoretical  DNA  that  coincidentally  matches his 
scholarly  progeny.  For  Agnew,  disagreements  and  divisions  within  criminology  have, 
indeed, prevented it from constructing a general or unified theory of crime (p.viii), rendered 
criminologists  unable  to  explain  most  of  the  variance  in  crime  (p.viii,  5),  impeded  their 
agreement on recommendations for controlling crime (p.5), and reduced the likelihood that 
criminologists will be heard and listened to by policymakers (p.5).  While deeply troubled by 
this inertia and the backbiting and bickering that has contributed to it, Agnew does not, to 
switch biblical metaphors, present a flood story or build a vessel to save us from a divine 
deluge.    Instead,  Toward  a  Unified  Criminology:  Integrating  Assumptions  about  Crime, 
People, and Society is a more modest tale in which Agnew attempts to repair the alleged 
fragmentation in criminology and to disprove accusations of the discipline’s failure. 
In  his  earlier  study,  Why  Do  Criminals  Offend?  A  General  Theory  of  Crime  and 
Delinquency  (2005),  Agnew  asserted  that  all  major  theories  of  crime  possess  some 
relevance  and  that  a  “complete  explanation  of  crime”  must  integrate  these  theories, 
describe  the  relationship  between  them,  and  explain  how  they  work  together  to  affect 
crime.  A “general theory of crime,” Agnew maintained, must answer seven questions: 1) 
what are the major causes of  crime?; 2) why do these causes increase the likelihood of 
crime?; 3) how are the causes of crime related to one another?; 4) what effect does crime 
have on its ‘causes’ (and what effect does prior crime have on subsequent crime)?; 5) how 
do the causes interact with one another in affecting crime?; 6) what are the timing and form 
of causal effects; and 7) what factors affect the level and operation of the direct causes of 
crime?   Examining research on the relationship between crime, individual traits, and the 
social environment, and tying together the key contributions from social learning, control, Journal of Theoretical and Philosopphical Criminology   Commentray 
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labeling, and bio-psychological theories of crime, among others, Agnew proposed a general 
theory to explain individual differences in the extent of crime (i.e., differences in offending 
between  individuals),  patterns  of  offending  over  the  life  course  (i.e.,  “within-individual” 
levels of offending over the life course), and group differences in crime rates.  
Although  Agnew  stands  by  the  general  theory  promulgated  in  Why  Do  Criminals 
Offend? A General Theory of Crime and Delinquency, he admits, at the beginning of Toward 
a Unified Criminology: Integrating Assumptions about Crime, People, and Society, that the 
former endeavor did not devote sufficient attention to the underlying assumptions about the 
nature  of  crime,  people,  society,  and  reality  (p.vi).    Claiming  that  the  assumptions 
criminologists  make  about  these  areas  influence  their  work  and  lie  at  the  root  of  the 
divisions  in  criminology,  Agnew  sets  out  examine,  analyze,  integrate  and  extend  the 
different  assumptions  made  by  current  criminological  theories  and  perspectives  so  as  to 
establish a more solid foundation on which to construct a general theory of crime.  In this 
way,  Toward  a  Unified  Criminology:  Integrating  Assumptions  about  Crime,  People,  and 
Society serves as a prequel to Why Do Criminals Offend? A General Theory of Crime and 
Delinquency. 
After  explaining  why  he  feels  that  criminology  is  a  “divided  discipline”  (p.2)—
essentially, a schism between mainstream and critical criminologists—Agnew  outlines the 
five  assumptions  (which  serve  as  the  five  substantive  chapters  of  Toward  a  Unified 
Criminology:  Integrating  Assumptions  about  Crime,  People,  and  Society)  that  he  asserts 
must be confronted and the differences between them resolved before  we can hold “any 
hope for a unified criminology” (p.6): a) the definition of crime (Chapter 2); b) determinism 
versus agency (Chapter 3); c) the nature of human nature (Chapter 4); d) the nature of 
society (Chapter 5); and 5) the nature of reality (Chapter 6).  For each of these chapters, 
Agnew  describes  the  underlying  assumptions  (presenting  those  made  by  mainstream 
criminologists before turning to alternative  ones, usually made by critical criminologists); 
the impact of these assumptions on the discipline of criminology (specifically, the types of Journal of Theoretical and Philosopphical Criminology   Commentray 
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crimes  contemplated,  their  causes,  their  recommended  control  strategies,  the  methods 
employed); and the evidence regarding the accuracy or utility of the different assumptions.  
Each chapter closes with a reformulated assumption or set of assumptions that integrate 
and extend those previously discussed.   Agnew concludes Toward a Unified Criminology: 
Integrating  Assumptions  about  Crime,  People,  and  Society  with  Chapter  7,  where  he 
reviews  the  differences  in  underlying  assumptions,  emphasizes  that  all  underlying 
assumptions  have  some  support,  summarizes  his  new  set  of  (integrated  and  extended) 
assumptions,  and  then  outlines  next  steps  for  examining  underlying  assumptions  and 
exploring additional assumptions—in furtherance of a unified theory of crime.  
Despite its humility, Toward a Unified Criminology: Integrating Assumptions about 
Crime,  People,  and  Society  is  an  ambitious  enterprise.    Lengthy  treatises  and  entire 
university  courses  have  examined  whether  the  definition  “crime”  should  include  harmful 
behaviors  not  proscribed  by  law  (Chapter  2),  whether  behavior  is  fully  determined  or 
whether individuals possess “free will” or agency to make and act on their choices (Chapter 
3),  whether  people  are  self-interested,  socially  concerned,  or  “blank  slates”  (Chapter  4), 
whether society is characterized by consensus or conflict (Chapter 5), and whether there is 
an objective reality or whether reality is socially constructed (Chapter 6).  Without a doubt, 
some  will  object  to  Agnew’s  reformulated  assumptions  or  his  review  of  the  evidence 
supporting  various  assumptions.    I  would  have  preferred  a  more  robust  discussion  of 
“autonomy” and “power” than the one that Agnew relegates to the footnotes of Chapter 3 
and,  in  Chapter  4,  would  have  liked  to  have  seen  greater  attention  to  psychoanalytic 
perspectives on altruism (see, e.g., Seelig and Dobelle 2001; Seelig and Rosof 2001) and 
work  in  evolutionary  biology  on  deceipt  and  self-deception  (see, e.g., Trivers 2011).  In 
fact,  expanding  the  evidence  for  some  of  the  various  assumptions  in  criminology  is  a 
worthwhile  endeavor  for  all  criminologists,  irrespective  of  their  theoretical  orientation  or Journal of Theoretical and Philosopphical Criminology   Commentray 
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view  of  Agnew’s  overall  endeavor.
2    Agnew  manages  to  cover  a  substantial  amount  of 
research that has or should inform the assumptions underlying criminological theory, but his 
discussion  is  far  from  exhaustive.    Doing  so,  however,  would  have  sacrificed  the  book’s 
readability—Toward  a  Unified  Criminology:  Integrating  Assumptions  about  Crime,  People, 
and Society is an amazingly accessible book.  Thus, readers should treat evidence that is 
missing or that Agnew under-analzes as an invitation, rather than a shortcoming.    
In a shorter review of Toward a Unified Criminology: Integrating Assumptions about 
Crime, People, and Society (Brisman In Press), I argued that the most compelling questions 
in the book pertain not to Agnew’s conclusions (the integrated and extended assumptions) 
or  his means of arriving  at  them,  but his  underlying premise  (i.e.,  that  criminology is a 
divided discipline) and the purpose the book is intended to serve (i.e., build a foundation for 
a unified theory of crime).  Notwithstanding Agnew’s assertions (as well those of Barak and 
DeKeseredy  above),  I  questioned  whether  criminology  really  is  a  divided  discipline.  As 
Agnew himself admits, criminology is unique among academic disciplines in that it studies a 
single topic (crime) from a variety of perspectives, rather than a range of topics from a 
common  perspective, as anthropology,  psychology,  and  sociology  do  (see  p.13).   At  the 
same  time,  Agnew  notes  that  “criminology  has  become  more  interdisciplinary  in  nature, 
drawing on a broader range of scholars and more readily incorporating outside research” 
(p.199).  If criminology is divided, I asked, is it any more divided than, say, evolutionary 
biology—a field that was recently described as one “that seems to lapse into discord every 
decade or so” (Lehrer 2012:40)?  Does criminology risk reversing course and losing some of 
its interdisciplinary vitality by working towards unity and integration?  At what point does 
                                                 
2  For  instance,  “childhood”  is  as  much  as  contested  concept  as  “crime”  and  one  whose  meaning,  scope,  and 
parameters—like that of “crime”—differs across cultures and over time (see generally Johnson 2012; Weil 2012).  
In Chapter 4, Agnew notes research in evolutionary psychology on the biological basis of various behaviors and 
traits, as well as research studying behaviors and traits that emerge in infancy.  A more thorough examination of 
literature from other disciplines on “adolescence,” “adulthood,” “childhood,” and “youth,” for example, would well-
serve  criminologists  interested  in  the  etiology  of  criminal,  delinquent,  and  deviant  behavior.    Keith  Hayward’s 
(2012) engagement with the dynamics and features of “emerging adulthood” in psychology is a recent, notable 
example, but more could be undertaken in this regard. Journal of Theoretical and Philosopphical Criminology   Commentray 
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healthy  debate  and  the  energetic  exchange  of  ideas  produce  disciplinary  divides?    Has 
criminology, indeed, reached this point (assuming that this can be measured)?   
If  criminology  is  a  divided  discipline,  I  continued,  is  this  such  an  unfortunate 
development?  Agnew points to the inability of criminologists to agree on recommendations 
for  controlling  crime  and  the  decreasing  likelihood  that  policymakers  will  listen  to 
criminologists as evidence of the pernicious effect of criminology’s divisiveness.  But is this 
the only way to measure a discipline’s ambit and well-being?  Throughout Toward a Unified 
Criminology: Integrating Assumptions about Crime, People, and Society, Agnew alternates 
between  discussing the  need  for  a  “unified  theory  of crime”  and  a  “unified  criminology.”  
These are different matters, however; criminology is much more than the search for why 
people commit crime so that we can control crime.      
Though  I  expressed  reservations  about  whether  we  should  reformulate  the 
underlying assumptions of criminology and use this integration towards a unified theory of 
crime,  I  stressed  that  a  little  more  open-mindedness  towards  differing  underlying 
assumptions  would  well  serve  criminologists  on  personal,  professional,  and  intellectual 
levels.
3  I  ended  my  review  by  urging  criminologists ,  regardless  of  whether  they  were 
convinced by  Agnew’s position about  criminology as a divided discipline and the  need to 
something about it (i.e., build a unified theory of crime) to heed his call to discuss and 
empirically examine the underlying assumptions of the discipline. 
My position has not changed and in the space provided me here, I wish to build upon 
some of the ideas expressed in the shorter review that I wrote for Theoretical Criminology.  
I am not  sure that criminology is a divided discipline or, if it is, whether it is any more 
                                                 
3 To be clear, I am not opposed to theory integration as a strategy for explaining more of the variation in crime.  As 
Agnew makes clear in Chapter 1—and as he has described elsewhere (see, e.g., Cullen and Agnew 2011)—the 
history  of  criminology  is  replete  with  efforts  at  theoretical  integration  and  one  could  argue  that  efforts  at 
integration are as much a part of the intellectual history of criminology as individual theory development.  While I 
understand  that  theories  often  develop  in  opposition  to  one  another  and  that  at  some  level  integration  may 
fundamentally  alter  and  thereby  destroy  the  beauty  and  utility  of  individual  theories,  I  disagree  with  Hirschi 
(1989:39) that it is “virtually pointless” to try to bring theories together in “pleasing and satisfactory” ways.  My 
point, as discussed further below, is that developing a unified theory of crime causation should not be viewed as 
the raison d’être of criminology: there are multiple Meccas. Journal of Theoretical and Philosopphical Criminology   Commentray 
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divided than any other “living” disciplines that have undergone significant internal strife and 
self-proclaimed  threats  to  their  legitimacy  and  future.  I  would  also  reassert  that 
criminology is much more than the study of the causes of crime and its control.  While these 
are important routes on the criminological map, many criminologists follow a different and 
no  less  important  path,  studying  what  crime  means  to  people  (e.g.,  crime  as  a  form  of 
expression,  crime  in  forms  of  expression).    In  as  much  as  we  might  investigate  the 
underlying assumptions that inform our beliefs about the causes of crime so that we can 
better explain variation in crime (which, Agnew contends, would better enable us to agree 
on recommendations for controlling crime), we might also use our study of crime as a lens 
with which to understand broader phenomena about a society.  What can the study of crime 
in China and Japan, for example, tell us about the former’s position on human rights and 
the latter’s position on respect and conformity?  To offer another example, the Zapotecs—
indigenous  people  of  Mexico—require  the  powerful  to  be  more  responsible  than  the 
powerless and thus penalize the rich who steal more severely than the poor (Nader 1980).  
Moreover, in Zapotec culture, endangering the interests of the Commons is among the most 
serious cases that are referred to court (Nader 2003).  What do these practices tell us about 
Zapotec social relations and worldviews—and what do our lack of similar sanctions tell us 
about our own?  Or, to offer a third example, consider the July 2012 shooting that took 
place in a crowded movie theater in Aurora, Colorado.  Criminological study of the shooting 
could  reveal  something  about  the  nature  of  (or  deficincies  in)  psychiatric  care  and  gun 
control law in the United States (see, e.g., Frosch 2012; Schwartz 2012).  But were we to 
limit our inquiry to questions regarding causation, prevention, and control, we would miss 
the chance to learn about the emotions that this type of event evokes, as well as the scope, 
extent, and emerging ways in which grief is expressed publicly (see, e.g., Preston 2012).  
These aspects of the shooting can reveal much about the absence or presence of anomie, 
standards, and values in contemporary U.S. culture—important lessons in and of themselves 
and ones which have bearing on the very issues of crime causation and control. Journal of Theoretical and Philosopphical Criminology   Commentray 
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In sum, Toward a Unified Criminology: Integrating Assumptions about Crime, People, 
and Society is a book that forces criminology to be introspective and reflective.  In so doing, 
it puts criminology at a sort of disciplinary crossroads.  The path entitled “a unified theory of 
crime” may lead us toward a “unified theory of crime causation,” which may, in turn, lead to 
an avenue headed to  capitals, legislative hills, and policymakers awaiting the delivery of 
prevention and control recommendations.  The path entitled “disciplinary enlightenment” is 
a bit more discursive and meandering.  It contains numerous exits, jughandles, cul-de-sacs, 
and dead-end streets, as well as bridges, tunnels, peaks, valleys, and scenic overlooks.  It 
is also under construction in parts and unfinished.  Travelers should understand that neither 
road leads to a “unified criminology”; any trail so marked will no more bring those on the 
road to the advertised destination as the Tower of Babel delivered settlers of Shinnar to the 
heavens.  The interstate marked “a unified theory of crime” is not a “better” conduit than 
the one labeled “disciplinary enlightenment” or vice versa.  They are different ways headed 
in different directions; they do not meet in Loch Lomond.  For now, I elect the more scenic 
disciplinary route, provided I can pick up the occasional hitchiker (to share stories and the 
driving),  stay  in  Citizens’  Band  radio  contact  with  my  friends  on  the  other  route,  and 
perhaps switch roads if I so desire when the two intersect.           
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